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Casenote

United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: The
Civil/Criminal Indirect Contempt Fine
Distinction Revisited

United Mine Workers v. Bagwell' involves the imposition of indirect
contempt fines stemming from a labor dispute in Virginia.2 In April
1989, respondents Clinchfield Coal and Sea "B" Mining Companies filed
suit to enjoin petitioner International Union, United Mine Workers of
America from conducting unlawful strike activities? The trial court
entered an injunction that prohibited the union and its members from
undertaking illegal strike-related activities.4 In subsequent hearings,

1. 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
2. Id. at 2555.
3. Id. The illegal strike activities included throwing rocks, smashing car windows,
blocking company facilities, and exceeding the number of picketers at specified locations.
Id. Apparently a favorite tool of the striking workers was the "jackrock." This device
consisted of nails welded together in such a way that a sharp point was always pointing
upwards. Jackrocks were spread across roadways to puncture tires. At the height of the
strike, police measured the number of jackrocks used in pounds rather than- count.
Respondents Brief at n.1.
4. 114 S. Ct. at 2555. In its order, the trial court characterized the fine schedule as
being designed to "coercte the defendants to comply with the court's injunctions" and that
it was "the court's intention that the fines tweire civil and coercive." United Mine Workers
v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 12 Va. App. 123, 126, 402 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1991).
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the court imposed over $64,000,000 in fines.5 The trial court required
that the companies prove violations of the injunction beyond a reasonable doubt but did not afford the union the right to a jury trial.6 While
the contempt order was on appeal the parties settled the labor dispute
through an agreement that vacated the contempt fines.' The trial court
granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss, lifted the injunction, and
vacated the fines that were payable to the companies.' The trial court
determined that the remaining $52,000,000 was not absolved through
the settlement and was still owed by the unions.9 Since the companies
had withdrawn from the action and local Commonwealth Attorneys
disqualified themselves, the trial court appointed John L. Bagwell to
collect the remaining fines on behalf of the Commonwealth.'0 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the order imposing contempt fines
and ordered that the contempt fines be vacated pursuant to the
settlement agreement." The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and
held that since the fines were civil, imposition of the fines did not
require a jury trial. 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed.' 3 Indirect criminal contempts involving fines in excess of fifty
million dollars are of such serious nature that the contemnor is entitled
to full criminal process including a jury trial."
From its inception in English common law, the distinction between
civil and criminal contempt fines has been based on the nature of the
contumacious conduct.' The basic distinction that is still used today
in the United States was established in Gompers v. Buck Stove. 6 The
Court held that the determination as to whether a contempt fine is
criminal or civil is based on the character and purpose of the contempt

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

114 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2556.
Id.
Id.

10. Id.
11. United Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 12 Va. App. 123, 133-34, 402 S.E.2d
899, 905 (1991).
12. Bagwell v. United Mine Workers, 244 Va. 463, 476-77, 423 S.E.2d 349, 357-59

(1992).
13. 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993).
14. 114 S. Ct. at 2562-63.
15. Earl C. Dudley, Getting Beyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction:A New Approach
to the Regulationof Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1034 n.28 (1993). This article
offers a comprehensive analysis of the history of the imposition of indirect contempt
sanctions in the United States. Id. at 1034-43.
16. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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fine.1" Even at this early stage, the determination between civil and
criminal contempts was a difficult task.' Justice Lamar stated that
"[c] ontempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And 'it
may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either
of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both."
Criminal contempts are those that are punitive in nature and designed
On the other hand, civil
to vindicate the authority of the court.'
contempt fines are imposed to compel a party to undertake an act
commanded by the court."' In Gompers, the Court focused on the
nature of the injunction the contemnors had violated.22 Another
distinction elicited at this time was that civil contempt fines involve the
parties to the action, whereas criminal contempt fines are between the
public and the contemnor.' The Court categorized the contempts as
civil based on the fact that the contempt proceedings were instigated by
one party against the other.2 The action did not involve a representative of the United States acting to vindicate judicial authority and thus
was not viewed as being criminal in nature.' While Gompers offers
guidance in distinguishing between contempts, the Court, in Hicks v.
Feiock,l recently emphasized the overlapping nature of civil and
criminal contempt:
In contempt cases, both civil and criminal relief have aspects that can
be seen as either remedial or punitive or both: when a court imposes

17. Id. at 441.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 329 (1904)).
20. Id. See also Bloom v. illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Criminal contempt is
comparable to an ordinary crime and is indistinguishable from ordinary criminal
convictions. Id. at 201. For this reason the right to a jury trial is fundamental in contempt
cases in which the criminal punishment would require a jury trial. Id. at 207-08. The
maximum length of imprisonment that can be imposed without a jury trial as petty
contempt is six months. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974).
21. 221 U.S. at 443. See also United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947) (established court's power to impose purgable civil fines that will be suspended upon
compliance with a court ordered instruction). If a contempt fine is non-compensatory, it
is civil only when used as a coercive sanction to compel performance. Penfield v. SEC, 330
U.S. 585 (1947).
22. 221 U.S. at 441. See also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
Imprisonment to compel testimony was held to be civil because it was conditional,
contingent on the contemnor testifying. Id. at 368. While imprisonment is punitive, the
conditional nature of the imprisonment makes the contempt civil. Id. at 370.
23. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444-45.
24. Id. at 44546.
25. Id. at 451-52.
26. 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
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fines and punishments on a contemnor, it is not only vindicating its
legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it also is seeking to
give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the contemnor's behavior
to conform to the terms required in the order.Y

While state law may offer procedural guidelines to a determination of
the nature of contempt, the question is one of federal law not state
law.'
In Hicks the Court established that criminal contempt is
characterized as determinate and unconditional while civil contempt is
conditional and purgable."
In the present case, the Supreme Court restated the characteristics
that typify criminal and civil contempts.3° From the standards
established in Gompers and Hicks, the Court laid out the framework
that the classification of a contempt is based on an objective examination
of the character and purpose of the relief itself and not the subjective
intent of the courts when imposing the contempt."1 The injunction from
which the contempt fines arose was a complex listing of prohibited
conduct with a variety of provisions.32 The Court based its review of
the contempt fines on an examination of the nature of the entire decree
of the trial court, instead of focusing on individual provisions that varied
in scope and quality or the subjective purpose set forth by the judge.'
The injunction established a listing of prohibited strike-related activities
and an associated fine for each violation.3 The Virginia Supreme
Court held, 5 and the respondents argued, that the prospective announcement of the fines made the contempt fines comparable to a
purgable civil contempt fine.' The Court reasoned that this listing of
banned activities was no different than ordinary criminal statutes that
codify prohibited conduct.3 7 Since the fines were not compensatory to
one party and the contemnor was not given the opportunity to purge
after imposition of the fine, the Court held that the fines were criminal
in nature.' In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the classification of the fines as criminal in nature, but justified this characteriza-

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 635.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 632-33.
114 S. Ct. at 2256-61.
Id.
Id. at 2561.
Id.
Id. at 2555.
Bagwell, 244 Va. at 477, 423 S.E.2d at 357.
114 S. Ct. at 2561.
Id. at 2562.
Id.
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tion on a historical analysis of the change of injunctions from simple
restrictions to complex and broad reaching decrees.' Justice Ginsburg
also held that the contempt fines were criminal in nature.'
She
attacked the argument that the fine schedule was conditional because
the unions could have avoided the fines through compliance with the
decree. 4 ' Ginsburg reasoned that all court orders would be labeled
conditional (and thus civil in nature) if viewed in this manner. 42
Justice Ginsburg also focused on the status of the parties in pursuit of
the remaining fines.' The litigants in the action had settled their
dispute and respondent Bagwell was pursuing the imposition of the fines
on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia." The prosecution of the
fines by a representative of the Commonwealth was indicative of the
criminal and punitive nature of the fines.'
The direct effect of the ruling in this case is that certain indirect
contempts resulting from violations of injunctions will be subject to full
criminal process.' Since the fines issued in this case were excessive,
the bright line dividing petty criminal contempts from serious criminal
contempts still has not been addressed.47 While there is a limitation
on the judicial power to impose indirect serious criminal contempts, the
other areas of contempt were left untouched." The ruling in BagweU
does not address direct contempts nor does it restrict the imposition of
petty contempts.49 Also, courts are free to continue to impose broad
compensatory awards in civil litigation.'
As far as redefining the
distinction between criminal and civil contempts, the Court restated the
parameters from Gompers and Hicks, but then concluded that "[ulnder
such circumstances, disinterested factfinding and even-handed adjudication were essential, and petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury
trial."5 ' In presenting these policy reasons to justify the result in the
case, the Court weakens the importance of the classification scheme it

39. 114 S. Ct. at 2563-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. 114 S. Ct. at 2565-67 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2567.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2556.
45. 114 S. Ct. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2563.
47. Id. at 2562. See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (establishes current
upper level of petty offenses at $10,000).
48. 114 S. Ct. at 2563.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id
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developed.5' By not explaining how the criminal/civil distinction rule
specifically applied to the injunction in this case, the Court weakened
the use of the determinate nature of the fines as justification for its
decision.' In emphasizing the purgable nature of civil contempt fines,
the Court has given judges who want to avoid the procedural restrictions
of imposing serious criminal contempts the incentive of fashioning
decrees so that the contemnor has the ability to purge the fine through
future conduct." While a specific area of the imposition of contempt
fines has been confined procedurally, only indirect serious criminal fines
fall within this restriction.'
FRANKLN P. BRANNEN, JR.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 2561-2563.
See id.

